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POINT X.

THE PROVISIONS OF THE SOUTH SALT LAKE
ORDINANCES ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT.
INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS OF THE ACT REMAIN
IN EFFECT EVEN THOUGH OTHERS MAY BE
DEEMED INVALID. • • • •
• •
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CONCLUSION.
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exercise powers _not delegated.to them by the state
or its Constitution. Each Justice soundly and
fundamentally said that the subject Ordinance
(32-1-1) was an attempt to exercise a power not
so delegated. At 439.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that §10-8-84 does
indeed

g~ve

additional wide powers to the city to do such

things as "are necessary and prop-er. to provide for. the safety
and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and
good order, comfort and convenience of the City and the
inhabitants t_hereof,

" We are still back where we started.

This is still not an ordinance necessary
fight against

prostitution~

OJ;

proper in the

It does not deal with prostitu-

tion directly,_ but deals with it in an indirect manner, which.
the Court, in Jensen, clearly said cannot be done.

This case

is not ·analogous to the Allred case, where simply another
aspect of the prost;:itution :business was prohibited.
·A

case involving many of the same issues as are present

here was before this Court in the case of Salt Lake City vs.
Revene, 124 P2d 537 (Utah 1942).

In that case, the Defendant

was charged.with theviolation of a city ordit).ance.regulating
the hours in which a barbershop could ·remain open.

Defendant

demurred to the charge, and both the trial court and Supreme
Court sustained that demurrer.

The city .argued that the

regulation of hours of the business was "valid under the police
power granted it by the legislature by §15-8-39, 15-8-84, and
15-8-61 . . . "at 538.

The statutes cited, under the code of

1933, were the same statutes now designated as §10-8-39, 10-8-84,
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•

and 10-8-61.

Section 10-8-39 is the general licens.e and tax-

ing authority, and

10~8-61

allows the city to make regulations

to "prevent the introduction of contagious, infectious or malig
nant diseases into the City.

"

Section 10-8-84, of course,

is the general statement which has been previously discussed.
The Court unanimously turned down the

city'~

position, which

the Court characterized as follows:
It is Plaintiff's position that the above ordinance
regulating the hours of a barber shop is a valid
exercise of the police power delegated by the legislature to the city to ''regulate" for the safety
and preservation of health of the community. The
Plai~tiff introduced evidence taken at a previous
time in the form of testimony by barbers and health
officials to the effect that a "tired barber was a
negligent barber", tending to afford an opportunity
for the spread of diseases associated with the
profession. Further, that from an administrative
standpoint it was impossible to inspect the barber
shop after 6 o'clock P.M. at 538.
The Court then discussed this contention, as follows:
It has been repeatedly stated by 1;his Court "That a
municipal corporation possesses and can exercise
the following powers, and no others: First, those
granted in express words; second, those necessary
or fairly implied in or incident to the powers
expressly granted; third, those essential to the
accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes
of the corporation, -- not simply convenient but
indispensable." (citations omitted) at 538.
The rule making power given to cities in reference
to barber shops does not mean any rule but such
rules reasonably related and designed to protect
the health of the public. at 539.
A tired barber may be a careless barber but it
does not follow that all shops which remain open
more than a certain number of hours engage the
same barbers throughout the entire period. Barbers
can work in shifts. If the object of the law was
-20-
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lt is appropriate here to refer to the case of rn·

~

Lane,

372 P2d.897 (Calif 1962) in which the Court stated as follows:
Defendant was convicted of the crime of "resorting,"
after a court trial in the Municipal Court for the
Los Angeles Judicial District on two charges of
violating §51.07 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code,
which provides: "No person shall resort to any
off ice building or to any room used or occupied
in connection with, or under the same management
and any cafe, restaurant, soft drink parlor, liquor
establishment, or similar businesses, or to any
public park or to any of the buildings therein or
to any vacant lot, room rooming house, lodging
house, residence, apartment house, hotel, house
trailer, street or sidewalk for the purpose of
having sexual intercourse with a person to whom
he or she is not married, or for the purpose of
performing or participating in any lewd act with
any such person. At 898.
The court, on page 899 of the decision lists numerous
acts of sexual intercourse which_have been made illegal by the
state, and then goes on to list lewd acts in public places,
crimes against children, indecent exposure, obscene exhibitions
and acts against public decency as being outlawed by the state
of California.

Defendant was accused of going from her own

living room to her own bedroom "for the purpose of having
sexual interc;:ourse with a male to whom she was not married."
(At 898)

The court stated:

Although living in a state of cohabitation and
a_dultery is prohibited, neither simple fornication
or adultery alone nor living in a state of cohabitation
and fornication has been made a crime in this state.
(citations omitted.)
Accordingly, a city ordinance attempting to make
sexual intercourse between persons not married to
each other criminal is in conflict with the state
law and is void. At 900.
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DECISION RENDERED BY THIS COURT.
Article VIII, §2 of The Constitution of Utah states
as follows:
The Supreme Court shall consist of five
Judges, which number may be increased or
decreased by the legislature, but no
alteration or increase shall have the
effect of removing a Judge from office.
A majority of the Judges constituting the
Court shall be necessary to form a quorum
or render a disposition. If a Justice of
the Supreme Court shall be disqualified
from sitting in a cause before said Court,
the remaining Judges shall call a District
Judge to sit with them on the hearing of
such cause.
Oral argument on the merits of this case took place on
November 10, 1980, with Chief Justice Crockett presiding,
accompanied by Justices Stewart, Hall and Wilkinson.

As

Justice Maughan was ill, his place was taken by Kenneth
Rigtrup, Judge of the Third Judicial District.

Justice

Wilkins resigned from the Court effective November 30, 1980
and Chief Justice Crockett's term ended at the end of
December, 1980.
the decision.

Neither of these Justices participated in
The decision was rendered by two regular

members of the Supreme Court and one District Court Judge.
Likewise, the companion case of Redwood GYII! v Salt Lake County
Commission, decided the same day and upon part of which the
decision in the instant case was based, was decided by two
regular members of this Court and one District Judge.
it appears

While

that the Constitution gives this Court authority

to make the decision as it did, the issues at hand call for
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POINT IV
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW SUPPORT APPELLANTS' POSITION
THAT §3B-8-5(1) OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SOUTH SALT LAKE
IS INVALID.
The most recent State Supreme case previously cited
by appellants regarding the validity of opposite sex massage
ordinances was City and County ·of D'enver v Nielson, 572
P.2d 484 (Col. 1977).

In Respondents' Memorandum, which

due to circumstances appellants had no opportunity to
respond

to, the case of City of Indianapoti·s v Wright,

371 N.E.2d 1298 (Ind. 1978) was cited.

Respondents cited

that case as another example where the constitutional
arguments of denial of equal protection or due process
were made by plaintiffs in a massage case, and went
unheeded by both state and federal courts.

Respondents,

however, failed to notice a most important part of the
holding rendered by that court.

A lower court had inval-

idated the law by determining that the massage ordinance
was an attempted local law in an area preempted by state
law.

The trial court so held, on the assumption that a

violation of the prohibition on massaging a member of the
opposite sex or touching of a patrons genitals was a criminal offense, punishable by the "general penalties"
provision of the Indiana code, as a misdemeanor.

The

Indiana State Code provides a specific misdemeanor penalty
-8-
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S. B. No. 26

2

required for the takinq of any action under

3

Practice Act.

4

( 10)

the

Utah

Medical

·For practitioners in the treatment of human ailments

5

in

accordance

6

colleqe,

7

reqistration,

8

designated

9

practice of obstetrics with the use of drugs or

or

with

the

tenets

institution,
of

in

which

his

a

professional

recognized
the

by

applicant

application

is

a

department

of

qraduate

as

a license, includinq the
medicine,

but

without

11

committee of five members to be

12

Notwithstanding

13

shall be licensed to

14

branches,

15

licensed to practice the treatment of

16

the use of druqs or medicine and without operative surgery, one

17

member shall be a citizen who is not licensed

18

art

19

Utah medical school.

20

two

surgery,

for

the

schoolr

10

and

operative

of

the

except operative minor surgery, a
desiqnated

provisions of
practice

members

shall

by

the

director.

section 58-1-6, one member

medicine

and

surqery

in

all

be practitioners of naturopathy
human

ailments

in

any

without

healinq

one member shall be on the staff of the university of

(11)

For

practitioners

of

naturopathy, a committee of

21

three members, each of whom shall be a graduate of a school

of

22

naturopathy

of

23

registration.

24

(12)

of

For

standing

recognized

practi~ioners

by

the

department

of physical therapy, a committee

25

of three members, each of whom shall be a licensed practitioner

26

of physical therapy in this state and a graduate of an approved

27

school of physical therapy.

28

(13)

For osteopathic physicians and surgeons, a committee

29

of three members

30

chartered college of osteopathy of recognized standing.

31
32

33
34

(14)

For

each

of

whom

optometrists,

shall

a

be

a

committee

graduate

of

a

of three licensed

optometrists.
(15)

For pharmacists, a committee of five pharmacists to

be designated as Utah state board of pharmacy.
-10-
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